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ABSTRACT 
A model of competitive procurements and contracting is presented. The key features of the 
model include pre-contract R&D, an endogenous number of symmetric firms, and a first-price 
sealed-bid procurement auction. The unique symmetric perfect free-entry equilibrium is 
characterized. If the R&D technology is variable scale with constant marginal returns, it is socially 
optimal for one firm to do all of the R&D and production. However, since the buyer considers only 
his own cost of procurement, the buyer will prefer to allow free entry, and the number of firms will
usually be larger than is socially optimal. If the R&D technology is fixed-scale, the buyer's choices
will be socially optimal if the buyer's opportunity cost of an alternative procurement is high. On the
other hand, if the opportunity cost is low the buyer will choose a reservation price lower than the 
socially optimal value and a number of firms no larger than the socially optimal number. Certainly, 
the type of R&D technology plays an important role in determining optimal R&D and procurement 
policies for the buyer and for society. 
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1. Introduction
ENTRY AND R&D COSTS 
In Competitive Procurements and Contracting 
Guofu Tan* 
California Institute of Technology 
Pasadena, CA 91125 
In competitive procurements and contracting, potential films usually participate in R&D 
activities. Some firms may not find it profitable to enter into competitive bidding because of tbe 
high costs of precontract R&D. In many procurement cases, only a small number of potential firms 
choose to submit bids (see Besen and Terasawa 1987). According to Hendricks, Porter, and 
Boudreau (1987), potential firms decide how much information to collect before participating in 
competitive bidding. In some instances, a firm may decide not to participate because the cost of 
searching for tbe information necessary to submit a bid exceeds the expected gain. In general, the 
decisions to acquire information and to submit bids depend on tbe R&D process, tbe costs of R&D, 
tbe costs of preparing bids, and tbe type of competitive bidding procedure in place. 
The existing literature on auctions and procurements, 1 except for French and McCormick
(1984), and McAfee and McMillan (1987a), typically assumes tbat the number of bidders is 
exogenous and constant.2 For a given number of firms, a buyer witb incomplete knowledge about 
tbe firms' production costs should procure the goods at tbe level at which tbe marginal benefit equals 
tbe marginal virtual cost.3 The buyer discriminates as a monoposonist. Asymmetry of information 
causes a welfare loss for tbe buyer. T'ne more the firms compete for tbe procurement contract, tbe 
less tbe welfare loss. When tbe number of firms goes to infinity, tbe welfare loss disappears; hence 
tbe most efficient outcome is reached. In this literature, entry behavior in auction and procurement 
processes has not been examined carefully. Altbough French and McCormick (1984), and McAfee 
and McMillan (1987a) have considered precontract costs (or fixed entry costs) and entry equilibria, 
prebidding R&D decisions have not been formally modelled.4 On tbe one hand, if fewer firms 
participate in tbe competitive bidding, tbe contract will be more profitable to tbe winning firm and 
each firm will tend to invest more in R&D. If tbe expected profit of tbe winning firm is positive, 
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more firms will enter the auction. On the other hand, the buyer may want to control the firms' R&D 
decisions through the choice of the contract auction rules. What is the equilibrium number of 
bidders under free entry and how does each potential firm make precontract R&D decisions? Is free 
entry of firms an optimal policy for the buyer? Moreover, is it socially optimal? These are the 
questions that I intend to answer in this paper. 
A model of competitive procurement with precontract R&D is considered in this paper. The 
number of firms is viewed as an endogenous variable in the model. I distinguish active firms (or 
informed firms) from actual bidders. A firm is active if it invests in R&D and becomes informed 
about demand and production cost. An actual bidder is a firm that submits a bid in the auction for 
the production contract. Similar to Tan (1989), the R&D activity by each firm is formally modelled 
as a stochastic process with certain R&D costs. I also allow for each firm a bid-preparation cost 
similar to that in Samuelson (1985). These R&D costs and bid-preparation costs affect the number 
of informed firms and the number of actual bidders. Under free entry, the equilibrium number of 
informed firms, the expected number of actual bidders, and the level of investment in R&D, are 
simultaneously determined and depend on the R&D costs, bid-preparation costs, and the type of 
auction. 
The next section describes the model and the equilibrium concept I am going to use. Then I 
show the existence and uniqueness of symmetric perfect free-entry equilibrium under the first-price 
sealed-bid auction with a given reservation price. Without bid-preparation costs, the total 
equilibrium expenditure on R&D among all firms decreases with the marginal cost of R&D. When 
the marginal cost of R&D approaches zero, the total expenditure by all firms goes to infinity no 
matter how large the fixed cost of R&D. On the other hand, when the marginal cost of R&D is 
relatively high, it will be very costly for any firm to conduct any R&D activity. Thus, the marginal 
cost of R&D is the key determinant of the total R&D expenditure. Without a fixed R&D cost, free 
entry causes an infinite number of firms to enter the R&D process. But with a positive fixed R&D 
cost, only a finite number of firms will decide to invest in R&D. The higher the fixed cost of R&D, 
the fewer the equilibrium number of active firms. In other words, the fixed cost of R&D plays an 
important role in determining the equilibrium number of active firms and the expected number of 
actual bidders. 
From the point of view of the buyer's optimal strategy, I show the following: First, consider 
the fixed-scale R&D technology. If the buyer's opportunity cost of procuring the good somewhere 
else is relatively high, no reservation price is necessary for the buyer. If the buyer's opportunity cost 
is relatively low, however, he should choose a reservation price which is lower than the opportunity 
cost. This optimal reservation price is higher than the reservation price the buyer would have chosen 
if there were no fixed R&D cost. Although there exists a distortion of the efficient outcome, the 
presence of positive fixed costs of R&D makes that distortion smaller. In both cases, the optimal 
number of informed firms for the buyer enter the procurement process under free entry. That is, free 
entry is optimal for the buyer conditional on the appropriate choice of a reservation price. Second, 
when R&D is subject to constant marginal returns to scale on expenditure, if the buyer is able to 
control each firm's R&D investment costlessly, he does not want to leave the R&D decisions and 
entry decisions to the firms. In general, he wants each firm to invest more in R&D than it wants to. 
Thus, when R&D decisions are not observable by the buyer, a moral hazard problem arises. Taking 
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each firm's R&D decision as a constraint, the best reservation price for the buyer may be either 
higher than or lower than his opportunity cost of an alternative procurement. 
Social optimality is characterized by the minimization of the total expected social costs. 
Under either the variable scale R&D technology with constant marginal returns or the fixed-scale 
R&D technology, social optimality requires the buyer to set his reservation price equal to the 
minimum of his opportunity cost and the highest possible production cost observation among all 
firms. Also, in contrast to the buyer's preferences, when each firm's R&D decision is subject to 
constant marginal returns to scale on expenditure, society prefers only one firm to conduct all of the 
R&D and production .. The comparison between the buyer's optimum and the social optimum shows 
that the R&D technology plays an important role in determining the optimal R&D and procurement 
policies for the buyer and for society. 
2. The Model
There is a single buyer (e.g. the government) who seeks to procure one unit of a certain 
novel good or service. The buyer wants to minimize the expected total costs of this procurement. 
There are many potential firms; each of which can produce a unit of the good at a potential 
unknown cost y. Each firm can invest in R&D for information about cost reduction and will observe 
a potential cost y which is drawn from a same random distribution 
H(ylx) =l-[1-F(y)]' (la) 
with the fixed support r,r, fl, y > 2:'. ;;;, 0, where F (y) is a continuously differentiable cumulative
distribution function with support r,r, fl and density function f (y ), and x e [0, + �) is the level of
investment in R&D. 5 I assume f (y) > 0 for all y e f,r, fl and y + F (y) If (y) is increasing in y. Let
G (y) = 1 - F (y) for all y • The R&D cost is assumed to be linear and the same for all firms:
( lb) 
where C 1;;;, O is the marginal cost ofR&D investment and C2:l! O is the fixed cost ofR&D. This 
R&D activity can be viewed as an independent experimental drawing process. For example, if the 
firm invests one unit (or one experiment) x = 1, a cost level y will be observed from the distribution
F (y ) at the cost C 1 + C 2• If the firm repeats this experiment x = k times, each additional experiment
costs C 1 • Then k numbers of production cost (y 1 • • • • •  Y•) will be observed at the cost C 1 k + C z. The
minimum cost level y of (y1, . • .  , y,) is subject to the distribution of the lowest-order statistic
H(y lk), which has the form of(la).
In this paper competitive procurement is modelled as a three-stage process. In the first stage, 
the buyer announces and commits to the general rules of procurements. I consider the first-price 
sealed-bid auction with an announced reservation price.6 In the second stage R&D is conducted 
durir1g which each firm invests in R&D a.t1d acquires inforrnation about the production cost. In the 
final stage, a competitive bidding procedure is conducted in which the buyer procures the good via 
the sealed-bid auction announced at the beginning. More specifically, this process can be described 
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as follows. First. the buyer announces the rules of the sealed-bid auction including a reservation 
price r which is no higher than the highest possible cost level y. The lowest bid will be accepted 
unless it is below r. Second, the firm will calculate its expected profit from bidding and decide to 
invest in R&D if this profit is no less than its R&D cost. Third, based on the observed production 
cost information y, the firm will bid unless the expected profit is less than the bid preparation cost K 
that each has to pay to participate in the bidding process. The winner is then chosen as th e  
contractor for production. The buyer is able to procure the good elsewhere at the cost y 0 if the 
lowest bid is higher than the reservation price r. A special case is when y 0 is very high, which 
means that there are no substitutes available for the buyer. Let Ym = min <Y, y OJ represent the
minimum of the highest possible production cost y which the firms observe and the buyer's 
opportunity cost y 0. 
Suppose x is predetermined at a fixed sunk cost C > 0 of R&D and there is no bid 
preparation cost, K = 0. Each firm will make a take-it-or-leave-it decision whether to try to reduce 
its production cost. Each firm will observe a production cost y and believes that other firms' 
observations of production cost are drawn independently from a cumulative distribution F (y) with 
the support [1'_, YJ. This is the case in French and McCormick (1984) and McAfee and McMillan 
(1987). On the other hand, suppose that each firm learns its production cost without any R&D cost. 
Given a fixed number of firms and their types, each firm submits a bid upon paying a cost K> 0. This 
is the case in Samuelson (1985). In order to see the importance of the type ofR&D technology, in 
this paper, I consider both the fixed-scale R&D technology and the variable scale R&D technology 
subject to constant marginal returns to scale on expenditure as described in ( l a) and (lb). Therefore, 
the present study can also be viewed as a generalization of the models by French and McCormick 
(1984), McAfee and McMillan (1987), and Samuelson (1987). 
In the next section, I will analyze a free-entry equilibrium for a particular reservation price 
of the buyer in a sealed-bid auction. A perfect free-entry equilibrium of the final two-stage game 
consists of a market structure n, an investment strategy (x1, • • •  , x.), and a bidding strategy
(B 1(y1), . . . .  B. (y.)) such that the following apply: (i) the bidding strategy (B 1(y1), . • •  , B. (y.)) is a 
Bayes-Nash equilibrium, (ii) the investment strategy (x1, • • •  , x.) is a noncooperative Nash
equilibrium, taking into account the optimal bidding strategy, (iii) each of n firms in the market must 
anticipate nonnegative profits, and (iv) n +I firms would earn negative profits. Entry decisions are 
simultaneous, not sequential. Under the fixed-scale R&D technology, it is easy to see that equilibria 
in both (i) and (ii) are symmetric. Under the variable, constant marginal return R&D technology,
however, asymmetric equilibria may exist.7 I will only consider symmetric equilibria in both (i) and 
(ii) and call (n, x, B (y )) a symmetric perfect free-entry equilibrium. I will show that, for a given 
reservation price, there exists a unique symmetric perfect free-entry equilibrium. In Section 4, we 
will see that the buyer prefers the free entry of firms and I will calculate which symmetric perfect 
free-entry equilibrium he should select by choosing an appropriate reservation price. Considerations 
from the point of view of social optimality are discussed in Section 5. 
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3. Symmetric Perfect Free-Entry Equilibrium
Given the rules of the sealed-bid auction with a reservation price r, suppose that a firm i 
believes that n firms including itself might invest in R&D and compete in the contract auction. I 
will show how the equilibrium number of firms is determined later on. Since each firm is assumed 
to have the same R&D technology (la) and (lb), firm i invests xi in R&D at a cost of C (xi) and
privately learns the new production cost Yi of supplying the good, which is independently drawn 
from the distribution H (yi I xi). Consider symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibria xi = xj = x for all
i and j. Firm costs are generated independently from a common distribution function H (y Ix) with
the support rz' fl. 
Suppose that in the auction firm i uses a strategy Bi =Bi(y;),8 which is strictly increasing in 
Yi, i = 1, . .. . n. Firm i with cost observation Yi will generate the following profit from bidding by
submitting Bi: 
1ti(Bi, y;) = (B1 -y;)Prob(winning) 
Consider symmetric bidding strategies Bi(y) = Bj(y) =B (y) for any i and j as the Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium. By the Envelope Theorem, at the Bayes-Nash equilibrium 
(2) 
The submission of a bid requires the expenditure of K in preparation costs. Free-exit implies 
rt(B (y ), y) -K 2' 0. Thus, the firm will not bid if costs are above some break-even level y. The
marginal firm y is indifferent between entering a bid or not If the marginal firm makes a bid, the 
optimal bid is the reservation price B (j) = r. The probability that the marginal firm y wins is
[I -H(j lx)]•-1 = [1-F(j)]<• -l)x "G(j)<•-1lx and the marginal firm's expected profit will be
rt(B (j), y) = (r - y)G (j)<• - lP<. Thus, the marginal firm y is determined by the following free-exit
condition (FE): 
(r - y)G (j)<• - llx = K.
Then, from (2) and (FE), we have 
rt(B(y),y)=K + r G(t)<•-1lxd1 
(FE) 
for al y :;; y. The firm with cost y > y will not bid because its expected profit from bidding will be
less than the bid preparation cost K. From (l't), y is strictly lower than the reservation price r 
because of the positive bid preparation cost. If K = O then y = r. That is, if no such cost existed, the
marginal firm would be the firm with a cost observation equal to the reservation price. 
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On the other hand, we know that, at the symmetric bidding equilibrium B = B (y ), 
1t(B {y), y) = (B {y) - y)G(y)<• -llx.
Comparing the above two expressions, we can easily write the equilibrium bidding function B (y) as 
the following: 
K f
Y G (I)<• -l)x dt
B (y) - y + + _,,_�- ----,.--,,-
G (y )<• - llx G (y )<- -llx (3) 
for al y e [)'. ,Y) and B ()1) = r. Because of the bid-preparation costK and the firms' private
information about y, each firm intends to bid a higher level than the true production cost y. The 
equilibrium bid function consists of the true production cost y, the information cost, and the bid 
preparation cost. From (3), the equilibrium bidding function B (y) is completely determined by n, x, 
andy. 
Suppose firm i invests x, in R&D. Since (n -l)x in the expression of 1t(B (y ), y) is the total 
expenditure on R&D by the other n -I finn and independent of x,, finn i's total expected profits 
from bidding will be 
r [ 1t(B{y),y) -KJ dH(y lx;)=t G(1)<•-llxH(1 lx;)dt
given that each other firm chooses x. At the symmetric Nash equilibrium, firm i will choose x, = x 
such that the marginal expected profit equals the marginal cost of investment in R&D. Fonnally, we 
have 
r G(1)""lnG(1)d1 + C1 = 0. (R&D) 
The second order condition is satisfied because -r G (1)(• -l)x +x,1n2G (t)dt < 0 for all X; 2' 0. Let
. -
E1t.(x ,Y) = r G(t)<• -l)xH(t lx)dt - C 1x - C 2 (4) 
be the firm's ex ante expected profit given the symmetric equilibrium strategies of both investment 
and bidding. Each potential firm enters the R&D process if its expected profit is nonnegative. That 
is, equilibrium entry gives 
E1t,(x,Y)<:O. (EEa) 
And any additional entrant n + 1 earns negative profits: 
E1t, + 1(x
', y') < 0, (EEb) 
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where x' and y' are the individual R&D expenditure and the break-even cost level which are
determined by (FE) and (R&D) when n + 1 finns simultaneously enter the R&D process. Since the
equilibrium bidding strategy B (y) is completely determined by (n, x, Y), we only have to consider
(n , x, y) for a symmetric perfect free-entry equilibrium. Therefore, for any given reservation price r, 
equations (3), (FE), (EEa), (EEb), and (R&D) simultaneously determine the symmetric perfect free­
entry equilibrium (n,, x,, y,) with the bidding function in (3), where n, is the equilibrium number of 
informed firms, x, is the each firm's equilibrium investment level in R&D, and y, is the break-even 
cost level that the informed firm will bid if its cost is no higher than y,. The total expenditure in 
R&D at the equilibrium is n,x,, denoted by x,. At the equilibrium, each informed firm invests x, in 
R&D and the firms with cost observations higher than y submit bids. The number of firms that 
actually submit bids is random and subject to a binomial distribution. Thus, the average (or 
expected) number of actual bidders is n. = n, H(Y, Ix,), which depends on the equilibrium number of
informed firms, the investment level in R&D, and the break-even cost level. When there is a bid
preparation cost, y, < y and hence the average number of actual bidders is less than the number of
informed firms. 
I need to show the existence and uniqueness of symmetric perfect free-entry equilibrium for 
a given reservation price. I first consider the special case where there is no bid preparation cost. 
Then, from (FE), y is the same as the reservation price r, and (R&D) is a one variable equation 
which determines the total investment level x,. Substituting X. into (EEa) and (EEb), it should be
easy to solve for the individual investment level x, and the number of firms n,. I allow the number 
of firms n to be a continuous variable at this moment and adjust the solution later on. Each firm 
enters the R&D process until its expected profit is zero and hence the equilibrium-entry conditions 
(EEa) and (EEb) can be represented by the equality 
r G (1)<• -l)x H (t lx)dt - C 1x - C2 = 0. (EE) 
Then the following are true: 
Proposition 1: In the case of K = 0, there exists a unique solution (n., x,, y,), with n, e (0, + =),
x, E (0, +=),and y, = r, to the system of equations (FE), (EE), and (R&D) if and only if C 2> O and
o < c1 <-f InG(1)d1. Furthermore, (a)
an. 
and 
ac2 
<O.
Proof: Since K = 0, by definition y, = r. Then (R&D) and (EE) form a recursive system. Let 
4><xi =r cc1/1ncc1)dt +c,,
then 4>(0) = r lnG (t )dt + C 1, 4>( + =) = C 1, and 4>' (X) > 0 for all x > 0. By continuity, $1 (X) has a unique
positive rool: and hence condition (R&D) uniquely determines a solution o < x, = n,x, <+= if and 
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only if 0 < C 1 < - r lnG (t )dt. Similarly, let
1j1(x)=f c<1f-·d1-f cc1),,d1-c,x-c2.
then 1J1(0); - C2, 1J1(+ =);+=,and 1Jl'(x) > 0 for all x > 0 because of equation (R&D). Then by
continuity, 1Jl(x) has a unique positive root x, if and only if 1J1(0); -C2 < 0, i.e. C 2 > 0, Let
n, ;X, Ix,. Therefore, (FE), (EE), and (R&D) determine a unique solution (n,,x,,y,) with
0 < ne < + OQ. 0 <Xe < + oo, and Ye ; r.
Now, taking the derivatives of both sides of equation (R&D) with respect to y, ; r, I have 
G(r{lnG(r)+ a; r G(t{ln2G(t)dt ;0.
ax 
Since o <G(t) < 1 for all t e (,)>,YJ, we have 0; >0 for any re (,)>,YJ. Taking the derivatives of
both sides of equation (R&D) at the free-entry equilibrium with respect to C 1, I get
ax r -
ad, � G(t(ln
2G(t)dt + 1 ;0
ox 
which obviously implies .,.-!- < 0. oC1 
Similarly, I can show (b) by ta1cing the derivatives of both sides of equation (EE) and (R&D)
at the free-entry equilibrium with respect to C 2• 
Q.E.D. 
From Proposition l ,  the higher the marginal cost of expenditure on R&D is, the lower the
total expenditure is. The condition c 1 < -f lnG (t)dt in Proposition 1 is required so that the total
expenditure on R&D is positive. That is, iii order to have some R&D activity in the industry, the 
marginal cost of R&D cannot be too high. On the other hand, when the marginal cost of R&D 
approaches zero, the total expenditure on R&D approaches infinity no matter how large the fixed 
cost of R&D is. 
The fixed cost of R&D is sunk and does not affect the total expenditure, but does affect the 
equilibrium number of informed firms and the average number of actual bidders as well. When this 
fixed cost decreases, the equilibrium number of firms increases. In the limit, as the fixed cost of 
R&D approaches zero, the equilibrium number of informed firms n, approaches infinity and each
firm invests almost zero in R&D. To avoid this limit case, the buyer could introduce a positive entry 
fee that each firm would pay prior to underta1cing an expenditure in R&D. The hJgher the ent.ry fee 
is, the less the number of firms is in the equilibrium. 
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If n, is an integer, each infonned finn gets exactly zero expected profit at the equilibrium. If 
n, is not an integer, the equilibrium needs to be adjusted. Let [n,] represents the largest integer 
which is less than or equal to n,. If [n,] finns become active, the total expenditure on R&D does not 
change. Then each finn invests x; = x, I [n,] on R&D and x; > x,. Since E rr.,<x,, r) = 0 from ( 4) and
(EE), we have 
Err[ •• 1cx;,r)-Err •. cx,,r)=[ cc1{-x;d1 - f cc1{·-x·d1-c,cx:-x,)
where x; <! � <! x, and the second equality holds because of Taylor's expansion and equation (R&D).
Thus each finn earns a positive expected profit. The above expression can also be used to estimate 
how much expected economic profits each finn is able to earn. 
On the other hand, if more than [n,] finns become active, each finn would invest x on R&D
which is strictly less than x,. A similar argument implies that each finn would earn a negative profit.
Thus, ([n,], x;, r) with (3) is the correct symmetric perfect free-entry equilibrium in this case.
In more general cases where K > 0, I am also able to show the existence and uniqueness of a
symmetric perfect free-entry equilibrium. For any given number of finns that invest in R&D; let us 
first look at the finns' R&D behavior and exit decisions. Let a= n be a continuous variable
parameter, a<! I. Given any a, consider the solution (xa, ya) to the equations system (FE) and
(R&D) and let rr(a) = Erra(xa.Yal be each finn's expected profit for a given reservation pricer when
there are a finns becoming active. Also let x a = ax a· Then I have
Proposition 2: In the case of K > 0, suppose ;11 < r -K � y, and 0 < C 1 <-r-K lnG (1 )dt. Then for
any et e [!,+=) there exists a unique solution Cxa,yal, withxa> 0 and ya e <i_,r -K), to the 
equations system (FE) and (R&D). Furthennore, 
(a) Xa, .Xa, Ya• and rr(a) are all continuous and strictly decreasing in a E (!, + =);
(b) Ya--+y_eq._,r-K), Xa--+0, Xa--+x->0, andrr(et)--+-C2whena--++=;
(c) Ya--+ r -K , Xa--+ x1, Xa--+ X1> and 7t(Ct)--+ 7t(I) when et--+ I. 
Proof: First of all, we show the existence and uniqueness of the solution to (FE) and (R&D). If 
a= I, then, from (FE), y1 = r -K. Equation (R&D) detennines a unique solution x1 > 0 since
0 < C 1 < -r-K lnG(t)dt by the assumption.
If a > I, then r -y > 0 from (FE) since K > 0. Then (FE) gives
<l>CYl = (a-l)x = lnK - ln(r -y) 
lnG(Y) 
which also implies <l>Q>_) = + =, <l>(r -K) = 0, and <i>'CYl < 0 for any y e Q>_, r -K). Substitute (5) into
(5) 
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equation (R&D) and let 
1j1(:9) = r G (t )ai;<iYCa-l)lnG (t )dt + C 1. 
f' -K Then 'l'Q'.) = C 1 > 0, 1jf(r -K) =), lnG (t)dt + C 1 < 0 by the assumption, and
1Jl'(j) = G (:9)ai;<iY(a-1>1nG (ji) + _a_.p' (:9) f' G (t)ai;<il1n2G (t)dt < 0a-1 � 
for any y E Q'., r - K). By the continuity of 'V<Y ), there exists a unique root Ya of 'I'· Substituting
y =ya into (5), we can calculatexa= <j>(:Ya) I (a-1) >0. Thus, for a> 1, there exists a unique solution
(xa, ya) to the equations system (FE) and (R&D) with Xa > 0 and Ya E Q'.. r -K).
Second, we prove that (a) holds. It is easy to see Xa, -'a• Ya• and it( a) are all continuously
differentiabl in a E (I,+�). Taking the derivatives of both sides of (FE) and (R&D) with respect to 
a, respectively, we obtain
and 
where 
p(:Y)= ;
y
[(r-y)G(:Y)(a-1)xJ =-G(ji)(a-l)x _x(a-l)(r-y)G(ji)'a-l)x-lf(ji) <O
iJ. 
for ally E (y ,  r -K). From (6) and (7), we can calculate ;a as the following: - QU 
hi h 1 1 · 1. ilYa all ilxa OXa w c c ear y imp 1es -:;- < O for a> I. Then from (7) we know - < O and - < O for all - � � -· V._.. U'-A · 
il(a-I)xa a> I. At the same time, from (6), we get ila > 0 for a> I.
(6) 
(7) 
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Using equations (4) and (R&D), we can calculate 
d ( ) ay - a(a -l)x i' -�=-a G(jJ'·-'•H(j l.tJ+ a 0 G(l)'·-'•H(tlxJ!nG(t)d1.d a.  aa a aa -
The results we obtained above imply drr(a) < O for all a> I.d a  
Third, let a approach infinity. The equation w<.YJ = O becomes
r- G(dCY)lnG(t)dt + C1 =0, (8) 
which determines a unique solution y _ E ()', r -K). Then (5) implies (a- l)xa--> <j>(j_), Xa--> 0, and
-'a--> <l>!J _) = .t_ > 0 when a-->+�. Using these results, we can easily see rr(a)--> - C2 when
a. -4 +co.
Finally, we prove (c). Since Ya is continuous and strictly decreasing in a for all a.> 1 and
has an upper bound r -K , then Ya has a limit when a. approaches I, denoted by y 0 with y 0 :<=; r -K. 
Suppose Yo < r -K. In the following, we can show that there exists a > I such that Yii = y0• Then
Ya> Yo for all a. E (1, a) and hence Yo cannot be the limit of Ya· This is a contradiction. Thus,
Yo=r-K. 
In fact, if y0 < r -K then <l>!J0) > 0, where <l>!J) is defined by (5). Let
v(a.) = r· G (1 )ci+CY,)'(a-l)lnG (I )di + c I• 
Then v'(a) < 0 for all a.> 1 and v(a)--> C 1>0 when a--> 1. Since Yo> y_ and <l><Jo) < <l><J-), using (8),
we get 
. . 
= (' G (t)�JlnG(t)dt + r· [ G(t)�J - G  (t)�J) lnG(t)dt < 0.
Thus, there exists a > 1 such that 1jl(a) = 0. Let x,; = a<j>(jo) I (a - !), then (x,;, Ja) is the unique
solution to (FE) and (R&D), where Yii =Yo·
Since Yo= r - K and <l>!Jo) = 0, equation (5) implies (a.-l)xa--> 0 when a.-> 1. From
equation 'V!JJ = 0, we know Xa--> x1 when a -> I. Thus, it is easy to see rr(a.)--> rr(l) when a.--> !.
Q.E.D. 
For any given number of active firms, the R&D expenditure and the break-even cost level 
are uniquely determined. When more firms become active, each active firm's expected profit 
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decreases. More competition makes the procurement contract less profitable to each firm. Each firm 
intends to invest less in R&D. The total expenditure on R&D among all firms is also lower. If there 
were no bid-preparation cost, the total R&D expenditure would not change with the number of active 
firms. More firms increase the total bid-preparation costs and discourage R&D over all. 
When the number of active firms goes to infinity, each firm invests almost zero on R&D 
although the total R&D expenditure approaches a positive amount. Each firm's expected profit 
approaches - C z. Thus if there is no fixed cost of R&D then free entry causes an infinite number of 
firms to enter the R&D process. If there is a positive fixed R&D cost then only a finite number of 
firms will decide to enter the R&D process. I will make this point more precise in the next 
proposition. Therefore, the fixed cost of R&D C 2 is the key determinant of the free-entry 
equilibrium number of firms although the latter is also affected directly or indirectly by the marginal 
cost of R&D c 1, the bidding preparation cost K, the reservation price r, and the distribution of 
production cost H (y Ix). 
If it(!),;; 0 for any reservation pricer, no firm can make any profit from conducting R&D and 
production. This is not an interesting case. I assume x (l) is positive for a given reservation pricer. 
That is, when there is only one firm participating in R&D activity and bidding for the procurement 
contract, that firm is able to earn positive profits. Under free entry, at least one firm will then enter 
the R&D and bidding process. From Proposition 2, each firm will earn a profit it( a) which is strictly
decreasing in the number of firms entered a. Firms enter until this profit equals zero. If the fixed
cost ofR&D is positive, the equilibrium number of active firms should be finite. Formally, I have 
Proposition 3: Suppose K, C" C2, it(!) are all positive and � < r -K :'>y. Then there exists a
unique symmetric perfect free-entry equilibrium (n, ,x, ,y,) with (3), where the integer n, ;;, I, x, > 0, 
and� < y, < r - K.
Proof:9 I first want to show that there exists a unique solution to (FE), (R&D), and ( EE). This is 
equivalent to showing that there exists a unique a;;, I such that it( a) = O. Let
u (x) = r-K H (t Ix )dt - C 1x -C 2 
for x ;;, 0, then 1t(l} = max u (x ). The assumptions it(!) > 0 and C 2 > 0 imply that there exists x 1 > 0 
such that it(!) = u(x 1) and u'(x1) = 0. Since u"(x) < 0 for all x ;;, 0, then u'(O) > u'(x1) = 0. That is, 
c 1 < -r-K lnG (t )dt. Thus, the assumptions in Proposition 2 are satisfied. According to Proposition
2, it( a) 1s continuous and strictly decreasing over a e [I, + =) with it(+ =) = -C 2 < 0. Then the 
assumption it(l) > O implies that there is a unique a• > I such that it( a*) = 0. 
Let n, = [a*] be the largest integer which is less than or equal to a•, and let x, = x[a"J and
y, = y fa'J· Since [a*]:'> a• < [a*]+ I , it( a*) =  0, and it( a) is strictly decreasing in a , then
E 1t,.(x., y,) = it([ a*]) ;;, 0 
and 
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E1t •. + i  = 1t([a*] + I) <0. 
Thus, (n,, x, , y,) satisfy (FE), (R&D), (EEa), and (EEb) with the integer n, <:I, x, > 0, and
y, E Q:, r -K). That is, with (3), (n,, x, , y,) is a unique symmetric perfect free-entry equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
4. Optimality from the Buyer's Point of View
Now, go back to the first stage of the three-stage game and look at the buyer's optimality 
problem. I want to know whether there exists a reservation price under which the free-entry 
equilibrium characterized in the last section is optimal for the buyer. 
For any given number of active filTils, the distribution of production cost y of the winning 
firm is I -[I -H (y Ix)]" = I  - G (y )"'. The buyer's ex ante expected costs in the competitive
procurement are 
. . 
r B(y)d(I - G(yr) = r yd(I -G(yr) + nK H(J Ix) + nC(x) + nE1t.(x, Y)
where E1t.(x , y) is a firm's expected profits under the symmetric equilibria, defined by (4). The
buyer's expected costs in the competitive procurement with R&D include the expected minimum 
production cost, the total R&D costs among all firms, the total expected bid-preparation costs, and 
the total expected profits among all filTils. 
(9) 
Under free entry, each firm enters the R&D and bidding p,rocesses until its expected profit 
E1t.(X ,y) equals zero. Therefore, the winner's expected profits r (B (y)-y)d(I - G(yr) from the
competitive bidding are equal to the total costs on both R&D and bid preparation among all of the 
firms. In other words, if free entry is allowed, the rents for the firms from contracting are dissipated 
by precontract R&D and bid-preparation activities. The question, as I will answer in this and the 
next sections, is whether these R&D activities are good for the buyer and society. 
At the symmetric free-entry equilibrium under a given reservation price, what the buyer has 
to pay is not just the expected minimum production cost, but also the total R&D cost n, (C 1x, + C 2J 
of all informed firms, and the total bid preparation cost n.K = n,KH(J, I x,) of all actual bidders as
well. One might have thought that the buyer has only to pay the R&D costs of the winner. But since 
firms are assumed to be symmetric and to adopt the same investment and bidding strategy, each has 
an equal probability to be the winner. Therefore, the buyer actually ex ante expects to pay all of the 
costs of R&D among active filTils. 
Remember that the buyer can procure the good elsewhere at the costy0 if the lowest bid is 
higher than the reservation price r. Because of the bid preparation cost, B (J) = r and the firm with 
cost y bids if and only if y s; y. The buyer actually procures the good at cost Yo elsewhere with
probability [1 -H(J I x)]"= G(J)"'. Thus, the buyer's total expected costs will be, remember
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y = y(r, n ,  x) from (FE),
EBC(r, n , x ) = r B(y)d(l-G(y)"")+ y0G(Y)"" 
=,i:: +(yo-YlG(Y)"" +nK -nKG(YY
. .
+ n f c<t)<·-1,,dt -<n -1)f c<1rd1. (10) 
The buyer wants to minimize his total ex ante expected costs of procurements EBC (r, n, x) by
selecting r, n, and possibly x .  Since the buyer has to pay all the costs in (9), as a tradeoff, he may
want to set y less than his opportunity cost y 0• 
I first consider a fixed-scale R&D technology. That is, each firm either invests in R&D at a 
cost C > 0 or does not invest If the firm invests in R&D, it observes its production y and believes
that other investing firms' production cost observations are independently drawn from the same
cumulative distribution F (y) with the support [,):'.,fl. I also assume that there is no bid preparation
cost before the competitive bidding; then y = r from (FE). Thus, the buyer's expected cost (10) can
simply be written as 
EBC(r, n) = ,i:: + (y0- r)G(r)" + r G(t)'dt + nf F(t)G(t)'-1dt. (11) 
Suppose C = 0. That is, each potential firm can observe its own production cost y without
any expense and believes that other firms' production costs are drawn independently from the same
distribution F (y ). The buyer then chooses (r, n) to maximize his expected profit (1 1). It can be
easily shown that the following are true: First, the buyer should choose the optimal reservation price 
r = r0 such that 
F (rci) 
ro+ f(ro) =Yo (12) 
if y 0 < y + l / f ('j) and r 0 = y otherwise (see also Riley and Samuelson 1981 for a proof). The
optimal reservation price r 0 for the buyer in (12) is independent of the number of firms and is strictly
less than his opportunity cost yo- It is possible that the buyer procures somewhere else at cost y0 
even though the winner in the competitive bidding offers a lower cost than y0• Thus, because of 
asymmetry of information between the buyer and firms, the buyer finds it in his interest to distort the 
outcome away from the efficient allocation. Second, since r 0 is independent of n , EBC (r 0, n) � ,i::, 
and EBC (r 0, n )  goes to ,i:: when n approaches infinity, the buyer prefers an infinite number of firms to
bid for the contract. Since each firm has a noc_ sitive expected orofit f'• F (t )G (I)_• - 1d1 , free entry will. ) . . . 
cause an infinite number of firms in the competitive bidding process and drive the production cost to 
the lowest bound ,i::. Therefore, the buyer prefers free entry in this case.
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Now, suppose C > 0. In order to become informed about production costs, each firm has to
pay a R&D cost C > O before the competitive bidding. This is the case considered by McAfee and 
McMillan (1987). But in their model, they assume that the opportunity cost of the procurement for
the buyer is so high that no reservation is needed. As we will see in the following, if the opportunity 
cost is relatively low, a reservation price is necessary for the buyer. The buyer chooses r e [!', y]
and n :<: 1 to minimize his expected costs (11) subject to each firm's nonnegative profits constraint
(EEa): 
(13) 
Consider n as a real variable. It is easy to see EBC (r, n) and E it. (r) are all continuous functions 
with respect to r and n. Since E it. (r) is increasing in r and decreasing in n, the constraint (13) with 
r E (!' ,YJ and n :<: 1 forms a non-empty compact set in R; if C < r· F (I )dt. Thus, there exists a
solution to the buyer's optimization problem. Let r* and n * be tfie buyer's optimal reservation price 
and the optimal number of firms, respectively. Then we have 
Proposition 4: Under a fixed-scale R&D technology, if 0 < C < r F(t)dt, then i) r*; y when
y0:<: y +I / f (Y) and r0 < r* <Yo wheny0,;; y; and ii) free entry causes the buyer's optimal number of
firms n'* to enter the competitive procurement process. 
Proof: The first order conditions of the buyer's optimization problem give the following: 
aEBC aEit. $,.(r, n) = - -a;-+ A.-a,:-; 0, 
and A.Eit, (r);O for interior solution r ;  r* e ()i_,Y) and n ;n• e (!,+ =),where A.; A.* :<:O is the
multiplier for the inequality constraint (13), and
$,.(r, n); nG(r)' -11 (r)[y0-r - (I - !:.) F(r)] n f(r) 
'l'>.(r, n); -(y0-r)G (r)'InG (r) 
- r G(1)'-1 [F(1)+ [ 1 +(n -l-A.)F(1)J lnG(1)J dt.
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First, consider the case y0 � 'j + I/ f (y}. For any r < Y and n � I, we have
$,.(r, n) � nG(r)"-
1/ (r)['j + 
f 
� -r - ;i;? + �g; J > 0
since r +F(r) If (r) is increasing in r. Thus, r• = 'j. We claim n• >I in this case. In fact, if n• = I
then the first order condition gives 'I',, .<Y, I) s O. Since E it1 ('j) > 0 by the assumption and
A.• E it1 (y) = 0 , we have A.• = 0. But 1Jfo{'j, I) = -t [ F (t) + lnG (t iJ dt > 0. This contradicts with
'l',,.<Y, 1) s 0. Therefore n• > I. This with the first order condition implies 'l'i.·<Y· n*) = 0. Since
d ('j *) 
1Jfo('j, n *) > 0, "'" ('j, n *) < 0, and 
'l'i.
d; 
n < 0 for all A.> 0, equation 'l'i.·<Y· n *) = 0 implies A.• > 0. 
Thus, A.* E it .('j) = 0 implies E it .('j) = 0 which determines a unique n * > I. Then IJF,.('j, n *) = 0 " " ' 
uniquely determines A.* e (0, n *). Therefore, r* = y and n * determined by E it .® = 0 are optimal for" 
the buyer. 
Second, consider the case y 0 s 'j. If n • = I, then the first order condition implies
'l'i.•<r*, I) s O. Supposer*= y, then <l>i..<Y• !) = f (Y)(y0- 'j) - (I -A.*) � 0 which implies A.*> 0. Then
the first order condition A.*Eit1('j) = O implies Eit1('j) = o. This contradicts with the assumption. Thus
it must be the case r* < 'j. Then <l>i..(r*, I )= O holds, that is,
_ * ( I  ' *)F(r*) Yo-r + -� --. 
f(r*) 
(14) 
Supposer* �y0, then Eit1(r*) � Eit1(y0) > 0 by the assumption. Thus A.*Eit1(Y) = 0 implies A.*= 0 and 
hence (14) implies y0 > r•. This contradicts tor* �y0• Therefore, r* <y0• Then the first order 
condition 
0 � 'l'i.•(r*, I) = - <Yo -r*)G (r*)lnG(r*)-r· [ F (t) + [ I -A.*F (t l] lnG (I)] dt
implies A.*> 0. We know r* > r0 from (14), where r0 is detemlined by (12). In summary, we have
shown that if n* =I then A.*> 0 and r0 < r* <y0•
If n * > 1, then the first order condition gives 'l'i.·<r*, n *) = 0. For n * > 1 and any r > 2'., 
equation IJfi.(r, n*) = 0  determines a unique A.= A.(r) e (0, n*) which is continuous at r = y, and
A.(y) e (0, n*). Because of the inequality Y + (1 - A.('j) ) -1-> y and the continuity, we have
n* f('j) 
(1 A.(r) )F(r) _ r +  - -- -->y 
n* f(r) 
<i?.(,i(r, n*) < n*G (r)""-1/ (r )(y0- 'j) S 0 
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when r is close enough to y and r < y. Thus, it must be the case r * < Y. Then <!>,_ ,{r •, n *) = 0 holds,
that is, 
'J...* F(r*) 
Yo=r* + (1 - -) --.n* f(r*) 
Combining (15) with 'l''<•(r*, n *) = 0, we obtain A.•= 'J...(r*) E (0, n*). Then
f '' • EJt.(r*)= ) F(t)G(t)" -1dt-C=O
(15) 
(16) 
and r0 < r•. In other words, equations (15), (16), and v,_.(r*, n *) = 0 simultaneously determiner•,
n*, and 'J...* withO<'J...* <n* and r0<r* <Yo· 
I have shown A.•> O in both cases. That is, the firm's nonnegative profits constraint (13) is 
binding. Therefore, if free entry is allowed, the buyer's optimal number of firms n • enter the R&D
process provided that the buyer chooses the optimal reservation price r*. 
QE.D. 
If n • is not an integer, then similar to the discussion in the last section, [n *] will be the 
optimal number of firms for the buyer. Each of [n*] firms earns a positive expected profit. 
The condition C < (• F(t)dt in Proposition 4 is eqllivalent to E1t1{ym) > 0 which means that,
under the highest reservation price Ym, if only one firm conducts R&D and production, that firm 
earns a positive expected profit. In other words, conducting R&D and production is potentially 
profitable. Otherwise, there is no interest in analyzing the optimal policy for the buyer or society. 
In a competitive procurement with a fixed cost of R&D, if the buyer's opportunity cost y0 is 
relatively high, no reservation price is needed and the optimal number of firms enter the procurement 
process. That is the same as the result obtained by McAfee and McMillan (1987). In addition, they 
show that the sealed-bid auction without reservation price is an optimal mechanism. 
If the opportunity cost Yo is relatively low (lower than the highest possible production cost 
level Y), however, the optimal number of potential firms still enter the procurement process provided
that the buyer chooses an optimal reservation pricer* which is lower than the buyer's opportunity 
cost y er The optimal reservation price r* is higher than the reservation price r 0 in the case where no 
such R&D cost exists. Thus, the distortion of the efficient outcome (see Section 5) due to 
asymmetry of information still exists, but the positive R&D cost reduces that distortion. The fact 
that each firm has to pay a positive cost to become informed reduces the asymmetry of information 
between the buyer and firms compared to the usual adverse selection models. I have also made a 
similar argument in Tan (1989). 
Now, consider a variable scale R&D process subject to constant marginal returns to scale on 
R&D expenditure, where expenditure x is ar1 endogenous continuous variable. Suppose that the 
buyer is able to control the firm's R&D decision and treat x as observable. Thus the buyer can 
control r, n, and x. Suppose that there is no bid-preparation cost, then the buyer wants to choose 
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(r, n, x) to solve his following optimization problem:
Min EBC(r,n,x)=l_ +(y0-r)G(r)"'+n r G(t)<•-1>zdt-(n -l)r G(t)"'dt
r,n,x - -
(17) 
for r e (,)i_,ji], n <>: l, and x <>: O. As before, I treatn as a real variable. Since EBC(r ,n ,x) is
continuous and the constraints form a compact set, there exists a solution to the above optimization 
problem (17). Would the buyer still be satisfied with the symmetric free-entry equilibrium with a 
reservation price as I characterized in the last section? In other words, would the buyer give each 
firm freedom to make decisions on R&D and entry even though he can control them? 
Let Err1(r) =max Err1(r ,x) over x e [0, +=) be the expected profit when there is only one
firm to conduct R&D and to make a bid under a buyer's reservation price r. It is easy to see E rr1 (r) 
is increasing in r. I assume E7t1(ym) > 0, that is, at the highest possible reservation price r = Ym, the
sole firm that does both R&D and production should earn a positive expected profit Then I have 
Proposition S: Suppose C 1, C 2, and E7t1(ym) are all positive, then there does not exist a reservation
price under which the symmetric free-entry equilibrium solves the buyer's optimization problem 
(17). 
Proof: Since C 1 > O and C 2 > O by the assumption, from the constraint of (17), x = o and x = + =
cannot be solutions to (17), nor r = l and n = + =. A necessary condition for the optimal interior
solution (r, n, x) to ( 17) is that there exist;\,;;,, O such that
ruf (r)G(r)"' -i[Yo-r - (1 - '!:._) H(r Ix)] "= 0,n h(r Ix) 
-x (y0 - r)G (r)"'InG (r) - r G (t)<• -1>zcpc1 Ix )dt 
+(J..-n)x r G(1)<•-1lzH(t lx)InG(t)dt :S:O, 
-n(y0-r)G(r)"'InG(r)+(J..-n)(n - 1)f G(1J<•-1"'H(1 lx)InG(t)dt
( ,, 
+ "'l - � G(t)"'lnG(t)dt -C il = 0, 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
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and AE 1t, (r, n) = 0, where <j>(t Ix) = 1 - G (t)' + xG(t)'lnG(t) > 0 for all t > ,)' . Suppose n > 1 .  If r = 'j 
then (19) with equality implies 0 < :\. < n which with (20) implies 
-r G (t )"' lnG (t )dt - C 1 < 0. (21a) 
If r < 'j then substituting ( 18) into (19) with both equality we observe :\. < n. Substituting (18) with 
equality into (20) and using Os A.< n ,  we also obtain 
-r G(t)"' lnG(t)dt -C1 < 0. (2lb) 
Therefore, any solution (r, n , x) with n > I  to (17) will violate the equilibrium condition (R&D). 
On the other hand, suppose n = I is a solution to (17) and satisfies equation (R&D), then (20) 
becomes 
(y0- r)G(r)'lnG(r) = 0. 
This together with (18) implies r = Ym· Then (19) becomes 
f'· f'· - ) <j>(t lx)dt + (:\.- l)x ) H(t lx)lnG(t)dt S 0- -
which implies :\. > 0. Thus, E 1t1 (ym) = 0. This violates the assumption; 
In summary, there does not exist a reservation price under which the symmetric free-entry 
equilibrium (n , x) determined by equations (R&D), (EEa), and (EEb) solves the buyer's optimization 
problem (17). 
Q.E.D. 
If the buyer can control each firm's R&D decision or the R&D investment is observable to 
him, he can force the firms to invest in R&D as described by (17). Proposition 5 says that there does 
not exist a reservation price under which the symmetric free-entry equilibrium reaches the buyer's 
optimum (17). In other words, the buyer's ideal optimum in (17) cannot be supported by any 
symmetric free-entry equilibrium. Therefore, the buyer would not want the firms to make their own 
R&D and entry decisions. 
From (21), : < 0, each firm's marginal profit ofR&D investment is negative at the buyer's 
optimum. That is, the buyer would require each active firm to invest more than it wants to. That 
implies that there will exist a moral hazard problem if the buyer is unable to control the R&D 
decision x or if x is unobservable to the buyer. Thus the buyer has to take each firm's R&D decision 
as a constraint. He should then solve the optimization problem ( 17) subject to an additional 
constraint (R&D). Solving this optimization problem, we know the following: If the opportunity 
cost Yo is high, the buyer should choose r = 'j. If Yo is relatively low, he should choose r such that 
_ (l A. ) H(r lx)Yo-r +  - -n h (r Ix) 
µ H, (r Ix) 
n h (r Ix) 
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where n ,  x ,  and the multipliers A. and µ are simultaneously detennined by the other first-order 
conditions including (EE) and (R&D). It can also be shown that A. >  O and µ >  0. That is, both the 
nonnegative profits constraint (EEa) and the R&D decision constraint (R&D) are binding. The buyer 
control free entry by offering a reservation price detennined by the above equation. The optimal 
number of finns is usually more than one under free entry. Because the effect of moral hazard 
interacts with the effect of asymmetric infonnation, the optimal reservation price r for the buyer may 
be either higher than or lower than his opportunity cost y0• 
S. Social Optimality 
The expected social costs include the expected production cost, the bid preparation cost, the 
R&D cost, and the opportunity cost: 
ESC = r yd ( l  -G(y)�) + nKH(j Ix) + nC(x) + y0G<Jr . (22) 
Comparing (22) with (10), we know ESC = EBC - nE 1t• . That is, the buyer cares about the finns'
expected profits which are the transfers from the buyer to the finns, but society does not care. What 
the society cares about is the total combination of costs on R&D, production, and bid preparation. 
Under free entry, the expected social cost will be the same as the buyer's expected cost. The social 
optimization problem is to choose (r, n ,  x ,  y) to minimize the expected social cost ESC (r, n ,  x ,  Y). 
As discussed in Proposition 4, I first consider the fixed-scale R&D technology. I also 
assume that there is no bid-preparation cost in this case. Then the expected social costs of 
procurements can simply be written as 
ESC (r, n) = "l. + (y0- r)G(r)" + r G(1)'d1 + nC. (23) 
The social planner wants to choose (r , n )  to minimize the expected social cost function (23) subject 
to the finn's nonnegative profit constraint (13). I have 
Proposition 6: Suppose K = 0, C > 0, and E7t1(ym) > 0, then r = Ym is socially optimal and each finn 
earns positive expected profits. 
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. Because of the continuity of ESC (r, n) and 
the compactness of the constraints, there exists a solution to the minimization problem (23) with 
. � � (13). Let (r*, n*) be a solunon. Let L = - ESC(r , n) + AE7t.(r), <Pi,(r, n) = Tr' and 'Vi.(r, n) = iln ,
where A. �  0 is the multiplier for the constraint (13). We can calculate 
<Pi,(r, n) = nG(r)'-1f (r)[y0-r + '!::.. F(r)] n f(r) 
2 1  
and 
'Vi.(r, n) = -(y0-r)G (r)"lnG(r)-C -r G(1)" - 1[ G(1}-AF(1}] lnG (t)dt.
The first-order conditions give $,,(r , n) = 0, 'Vi.(r, n) = 0, and AE7t. (r) = 0 for interior solution. 
First, consider the case y0 'C. y, then
$,,(r , n) 'C. nG(r)" - 1f(r)[y-r + : ;g;) > 0
for all r <y. Thus r* = y. Suppose n• = 1, then A. =  0 because AE7t1(y) = 0 and E7t1(y} > 0 by the
assumption. Suppose !! • > 1, then the first-order conditions give 'Vi.<Y, n *) = 0. If A. >  0, then
'Vi.<J, n*) = O implies f G(1)"lnG(t}dt + C  < 0. But
t G(t}" - 1k (1) + G(t)lnG(1)J d1 > 0
and hence E1t.(Y) = r G(1)" -1F(1)dt -C > 0. which implies A. =  0. This contradicts to A. >  0. Thus,
A. =  0. Then ljfo{Y, n *) = 0 can be written as r G (1 }"•lnG (I )dt + C = 0. Thus E 1t,.(y} > 0.
Second, consider the case Yo 'C. J. Suppose n* = 1. If r* = y then
$,,{Y, 1) =f (Y)(y0 - y) + A.  I n  'C. 0 which implies A. >  0 and hence E7t1(Y} = 0. But that contradicts to 
the assumption E 7t1{Y) > 0. This contradiction means r• <y. Then <l>i.(r*, 1) = 0. That is,
Yo = r* -AF (r*) I f  (r*) which implies r* 'C. y0• If r* > y0 then E7t1(r*) > E 7t1(yo) > 0 by the 
assumption. Then A. =  0 which implies r* = y0• This is a contradiction. Thus, r* = y0• Suppose
n • > 1, then the first-order condition gives 'Vi.(r*, n *) = O. If r* = y, then 'V>.<Y, n *) = 0 becomes
C + t G(1)•*- 1[ G (1)-AF(t)J lnG(t}dl = 0.
- -
If A. >  0 then C + r G (t )"*!nG (I )dt < 0 which implies E 1t,.(Y) = r G (I)"• -lp (I )dt -C > 0. Then A. =  0. 
This contradicts iO A. > 0. Thus, A. =  0. Then <Po(r , n *) = n *G (rt"• - 1 f (r )(y 0 - r) < O when r is less 
than but very close to y. Thus r* cannot be y. In other words, r* < y. Then <l>i.(r*, n*) = O. That is, 
* A. F(r*) Yo = r - -;;; f (r*) °
Now, if A. >  0 then 'Vi.(r*, n*) = 0 implies C + r· G(1)"*1nG(1)d1 < 0, which also implies
fr* • E 7t,,(r*) = i G(1)" - 1 F(1}d1 >0 .
Then A. =  0 which contradicts to A. >  0. Thus, A. =  O which implies r*  = Yo and E7t ,(yo} > 0 .• 
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In summary, we have shown r* = Ym and Eit,.(ym) > 0.
Q.E.D. 
From Proposition 6, the socially optimal reservation price is r* = Ym and society allows each
firm to earn positive expected profits. The constraint (13) is not binding. The social optimal number 
of firms n * is determined by minimizing ESC (ym, n) with respect to n .  Since 
aESC(y n) f'· 
an
m• = C  +� G(t)' lnG(t)dt
and ESC(ym , n) is convex in n ,  then n* is determined as the following: If C + r· G(t)lnG(t)dt ;;, 0
then n * = I. If C + r· G (t )lnG (t )dt < 0 then n * > I and satisfies
r,· • C + j, G(t)' lnG(t)dt = 0.
Therefore, society may prefer more than one firm to conduct private R&D under the fixed-scale 
R&D technology. 
The implications of Proposition 4 and 6 are the following: In the first case where the 
opportunity cost y 0 is high, the buyer should select a socially optimal reservation price r = y, the 
highest possible cost observation by the firms. In other words, both the buyer and society agree that 
a reservation price is not necessary. Let n•* be the optimal number of firms for the buyer which is
determined by Proposition 4, then n•* > I and Eit .CY)= 0. Notice that ESC cy, n) is strictly convex in•• 
n and 
ESC(y, n ) -ESCcy, n - 1) = -Eit,(y) 
for all n > I .  Then ESC cy, n•*) = ESC cy, n•* - I). Thus, n,* - I < n * < n.*. Because an integer must 
be picked, the social optimal number of firms will be the same as the buyer's optimal number of 
firms. Therefore, free entry and a first-price sealed-bid auction without any reservation price achieve 
the social optimum. This result was also observed by McAfee and McMillan (1987a). 
In the second case where the opportunity cost y 0 is low Oower than the highest possible
production cost observation y), however, the buyer intends to offer a lower reservation price relative 
to the social optimum, i.e. '•* < Yo- That may cause fewer number of firms to enter the R&D process,
relative to the social optimum. In fact, since n•* > I and E it .(y0) > E it .er.*) = O from Proposition 4 
.. .. 
and since 
for n > I,  we have ESC (y 0, n•*) < ESC (y 0, n•* - I). On the other hand,
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iJESC(y0, n) J" •* - 1 [ � () I _ • 1 = G(1) ' F(l) +G (t)lnG(t) dt -E1t .(y0) < 0.n ,, _ ,.b _ no 
and ESC (y 0, n) is convex in n .  Thus, we have either n,* - I < n • < n: or n • ?. n:. Given the integer 
problem, the socially optimal number of firms will be at least as larger as the buyer's optimal 
number of firms. In summary, we have the following Corollary of Proposition 4 and 6:
Corollary: Under the fixed-scale R&D technology, if E1t1(ym) > 0, then the buyer prefers free entry, 
society does not, and. the following hold as well: 
(i) If y0?. y + 1 1  f (Y) then the buyer's choices of a reservation price and number of firms 
are socially optimal; 
(ii) If y 0 ,;; y then the buyer chooses a reservation price lower than the socially optimal 
value and a number of firms no larger than the socially optimal number. 
When the R&D technology is subject to constant marginal returns to scale on expenditure 
and there is a bid-preparation cost, the social planner wants to minimize the expected social costs 
(22) subject to (13), (R&D), and (FE). Then I have 
Proposition 7: Suppose C 1, c,. and E1t1(ym -K) are all positive, then n = I  with r = Ym and 
y = Ym -K is socially optimal. 
Proof: Because of the continuity of ESC (r, n ,  x, J) and the compacmess of the constraints, there 
exists a solution (r*, n*,x*, J*) to the social optimization problem. Let A?.  0 and µ be the multipliers 
for the constraint (13) and (R&D), respectively, and 
L =-ESC(r, n ,x ,J) + AE1t.(r, x) + µ[-t G(t)""lnG(t)dt - c1J 
We can calculate 
iJL = nh (Y lx)G(J)<• - tlx [ - · + A H(Y lx) + .!!. H, (Y lx)] -nKh(Y lx)
iJy 
Yo y n h (Y Ix) n h (Y Ix) 
:� =-n (y0 -y)G(Y)"'lnG(Y) - nKH,(Y lx) - n[f G (t)"'lnG(t)dt + c1J 
. . 
+1..cn - 1)f ac1i<• -
1>xnc1 1x)lnG(1)d1 - nµf act)"'1n2ac1)d1
iJL = -x(y0 -y)G (Y)""lnG(Y) -KH(Y Ix)
iJn 
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. . 
+A.x rG (t)• -1l•H(t lx)lnG(t)dt - µxr G(t)"ln2G(t)dt
Since C 1 > O and C2 > 0, constraint (13) implies x = 0 and x = + � cannot be a solution. Thus, the 
first-order condition gives �� = 0. Then 
aL aL aL n- =n- -x-an an ax 
= - nC2- nK[ H(j lx) -xH, (j Ix)] + A.xt G(t)<• - !Jx H(l lx)lnG (t)dt
< 0. 
Therefore, n * = 1. Then (FE) implies y = r -K and the first-order conditions aL = 0 and aa
L = 0
a-y x 
become 
and 
H(r -K Ix) H,(r -K Ix)Yo - r +J.. h(r - K lx) + µ h (r -K lx)
0 
(y0- y)G (r -K)'lnG(r -K) + µf -K G(t)'ln2G(t)dt = 0.
Consider the case Yo ;,, y. If r* < y then r* < y0• Then (24) implies µ < O and (25) implies 
µ > 0. This contradiction means r• = y and Y* = y -K. 
(24) 
(25) 
Consider the case y0 < y. If r* < y0 then (24) implies µ < 0 and (25) implies µ >  0. This is a
contradiction. If y0 < r* S y  then (25) implies µ <  0 and hence (24) implies ;\. > 0. Thus, 
Eit1(r* -K) = 0. But Eit1(r* -K) >Eit1(y0-K) > 0 by the assumption. This is also a contradiction. 
Therefore, r* = y0 and Y* = y0-K. 
Q.E.D. 
Even if there are R&D decisions and bid-preparation costs, setting the buyer's reservation 
price r equal to the minimum of the opportunity cost y 0 and the highest possible production cost y to 
be observed by the firms is socially optimal. The most interesting result is that society prefers only 
one firm to conduct R&D and production when R&D is subject to constant marginal returns to scale 
on expenditure. Remember ti'iat R&D is an iridependent drawing process and t.11.e R&D outcome of n. 
firms will be the same as the R&D outcome of one firm that invests the same amount as all n firms. 
But, because of the fixed cost of R&D, more firms participating in R&D result in higher total R&D 
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costs. Thus, for society, one firm conducting all of  the R&D and production is more efficient than 
more firms. Contrary to the social optimum, the buyer usually prefers more than one firm to enter 
both R&D and bidding processes. 
From the above comparison analysis, we have seen that the optimal policies from the point 
of view of the buyer and society are different under two types of R&D technology: the fixed-scale 
and the variable scale with constant marginal returns. The type of R&D technology plays an 
important role in determining optimal R&D and procurement policies forthe buyer and for society. 
When R&D is subject to diminishing or increasing marginal returns to scale on expenditure, we 
expect that some of these results will also change. Further research is needed on this topic. 
6. Remarks
I have presented a model of private R&D and public procurement with entry. From the 
above analysis, when R&D technology is subject to constant marginal returns to scale, society 
prefers to have only one firm conduct all of the R&D and production and the buyer usually prefers 
more firms to invest in private R&D. But the buyer still has to pay the total R&D costs of all firms 
even if only one contractor is chosen for production. Therefore. the buyer should like R&D to be 
conducted efficiently. This raises the question whether there exist alternative and more efficient 
ways to manage R&D activities. One way might be to have the buyer do the R&D himself and then 
release the R&D outcomes to potential firms. The buyer could also hire an agency (private or 
public) to conduct R&D and force the agency to transfer the R&D outcomes to potential producers. 
That would eliminate the duplication of effort that occurs when several firms conduct R&D at the 
same time. For instance, in some defense procurement cases, a government agency (e.g. NASA, 
DOD) conducts the basic research and may also develop the new products. Then, the government 
agency transfers the technology information to potential contractors for production and chooses the 
most efficient contractor to produce the product 
There are some disadvantages in releasing or transfering such R&D information. (i) 
Credibility: French and McConnick (1984) have argued that if the buyer does R&D himself, he has 
an incentive to provide optimistic information about the technology and demand because of the 
conflicts of interests between him and the firms. Unless this incentive can be controlled, the buyer's 
information may be ignored by the firms. (ii) Transferability: Some technological information (or 
physical capital, human capital, and so on) obtained by the buyer or the hired agency may not be 
easily transferable (Williamson 1976, Laffont and Tirole 1988). (iii) Learning costs: it takes time or 
effort for the firms to understand the technological information or prototypes. There are learning 
costs which will be incurred before production can begin. It would be desirable to investigate and 
compare different arrangements ofR&D management and to identify the advantages and 
disadvantages of each. Successful modelling will certainly help us better understand current practice 
in government R&D management. 
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Footnotes 
1. For a survey on auctions and bidding, see McAfee and McMillan (1987c). For a survey on 
the economic theory of procurement and contracting, see Besen and Terasawa (1987).
2.  McAfee and McMillan (1987b) allow the number of actual bidders to be stochastic, but the 
probability of any subset of potential bidders becoming the set of actual bidders is assumed 
to be exogenous and independent of their types. They have shown that the optimal auction 
is the same whether or not the risk-neutral bidders know who their competitors are. 
3. See Riordan and Sappington (1987) and Dasgupta and Spulber (1989) for these results on 
procurements. 
4. Rob (1986) and Tan (1988) have formally incorporated R&D activities into competitive 
procurement processes for a given number of firms and characterized the equilibrium 
investment level in R&D and the optimal procurement contract. 
5. This R&D process of cost reduction is just an independent one-shot drawing process. It is
different from a sequential search process. The first x dollars have the same effect on the 
R&D outcome as the last x dollars. To some extent, this process is subject to constant 
marginal returns to expenditure in R&D. I consider this special technology to simplify 
analyzing the free entry equilibrium in this paper. The analysis should be extended to more 
general cases, such as the diminishing marginal return R&D technologies which are 
considered in Tan (1988).
6. I consider the first-price sealed-bid auction in this paper because it is often used in practical 
procurement processes. The second-price sealed-bid auction with the same reservation price 
will not change the firms' net expected profits from bidding and hence should give the same 
results. It would be interesting to look at the effects of oral auctions on the firms' R&D 
investment strategies (possibly asymmetric) by allowing some firms to have information 
advantages before R&D. I thank Preston McAfee for this interesting point. 
7. Under the first-price sealed-bid auction, if [1 - F (y)] / f (y) is nonincreasing in y and 
B, !:t_) =Bi <:t_) for all i ,  j = l, . . . . n , I can show that there do not exist any asymmetric 
(bidding and investment) equilibria at both (i) and (ii). Under the second-price sealed-bid 
auction, the bidding firms bid their true observations of production costs and asymmetric 
investment equilibria in (ii) always exist. Coordination is needed for equilibrium selection 
in this case. I ignore such problems in this paper. 
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8. Since firm i is unable to observe the other firms' investment levels x_. ,  its bidding strategy 
B, can not depend onx_, directly. Symmetric beliefs of each firm enable us to consider 
symmetric bidding strategies (see also Foomote 6). I thank Tom Palfrey for this helpful 
comment 
9. This proof is based on Proposition 2. An alternative proof of Proposition 3 is to construct a
compact, convex set S and a continuous mapping from S to s ,  based upon the equations 
(EE), (R&D), and (FE), and to use the Brouwer's fixed point theorem. Interested readers can 
get the manuscript of the second proof from the author. 
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